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LAND USE MANAGEMENT: RETIREMENT COMMUNITIES
EVADE PUBLIC SCHOOL IMPACT FEES
Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P.,
760 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 2000)
James H. Sullivan*
Under protest, Appellee paid $86,984.07 in public school impact fees
to Appellant County to develop an eighty-four unit mobile home park for
persons aged 55 and older.' Appellee then filed suit in the Circuit Court for
Volusia County claiming that public school impact fees are
unconstitutional as applied to a retirement commnunity.2 Volusia County
Ordinance No. 97-7 imposed on new residential development a fee to help
defray the cost of public school expansion made necessary by such
development.3 However, Appellee's development included an irrevocable
deed restriction prohibiting "any person under the age of eighteen (18)
years" from permanently residing in the development.4 Appellee claimed
that no children from the development would swell County rolls and,
therefore, no fee should be assessed.5 The trial court granted summary
judgment to Appellee, reasoning that no substantial relationship existed
between Appellee's development and the need for new schools and noting
that Appellee's development would not benefit from the construction of
new schools. 6 Volusia County appealed and simultaneously requested
certification of the case to the Florida Supreme Court as a matter of great
public importance.7 The Fifth District Court of Appeals did not hear the
case but rather granted Appellant's request as provided in the pass-through

* The author thanks Chris Smart, Erica Shultz, and Dr. James Nicholas for their suggestions
regarding this writing and claims persisting weaknesses as his own.
1. Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 128-30 (Fla. 2000).
2. l t at 128.
3. Id at 129-30; Volusia County, Fla., Ordinance 97-7, § VI (May 15, 1997) (enacting
Volusia County, Fla., Code of Ordinances art. V, ch. 70, § 70-174(d)). As the court explained,
"[t]he impactfee represents the cost per dwelling unit of providing new facilities.... In calculating
the fee, the County utilized the student generation rate, which is the average number of public
school students per dwelling unit." Volusia County, 760 So. 2d at 130.
4. Volusia County, 760 So. 2d at 128 (quoting Supplemental Declaration of Covenants,
Conditions and Restrictions For Aberdeen at Ormond Beach Manufactured Housing Community
art. II, §§ 2.2, 3.2). The court noted that the minimum age requirements of the deed restriction
"comply with the 'housing forolder persons' exemption of the Federal Fair Housing Act." Id.;see

42 U.S.C. § 3607 (1994 & Supp. 11996).
5. See Volusia County, 760 So. 2d at 130.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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certification provision of Florida's Constitution.8 The Florida Supreme
Court affirmed and HELD, where residential development has no potential
to increase school enrollment, public school impact fees are unwarranted.9
The Florida Supreme Court first upheld the legality of impact fees in
Contractors& BuildersAss'n of Pinellas County v. City of Dunedin.' 0 In
Dunedin,the plaintiff challenged the city's impact fee for water and sewer
service as an unconstitutional tax beyond the authority of a municipality."
Rejecting this argument, the court reasoned that a municipality's authority
to establish rates for water and sewer service 2 included the authority to
charge new users a reasonable fee for expanding the service to meet their
needs. 3 However, the court required (1) that impact fees "not exceed a pro
rata share of reasonably anticipated costs of expansion" and (2) that
monies thus collected only be spent to meet the costs of such expansion. 4
These two requirements distinguish an impact fee from a tax and form
the basis of the dual rational nexus test explained in Hollywood, Inc. v.
Broward County."5 In Hollywood, the plaintiff, seeking a permit to
subdivide property for residential development, challenged a county
ordinance imposing an impact fee for expanding the county's park system
to serve the new subdivision. 6 Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeals

8. Id.; FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(5).
9. Volusia County, 760 So. 2d at 137.
10. 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976). On the history and developing use of impact fees nationwide,
see generally JAMES C. NICHOLAS ET AL, A PRACITIONER'S GUIDE TO DEVELOPMENT IMPACT
FEES (1991); Julian C. Juergensmeyer & Robert M. Blake, Impact Fees: An Answer to Local
Governments' CapitalFunding Dilemma, 9 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 415 (1981); Bernard V. Keenan &
Peter A. Buchsbaum, Report of the Subcommittee on Exactions and Impact Fees, 23 URB. LAW.
627 (1991); Arthur C. Nelson, Development Impact Fees: The Next Generation, 26 URB. LAW.
541 (1994); Deborah Rhoads, DeveloperExactions and Public DecisionMaking in the United
States and England, 11 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COM. L. 469 (1994); Nancy E. Stroud & Susan L.
Trevarthen, Defensible Exactions after Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and Dolan v.
City of Tigard, 25 STETSON L. REV. 719 (1996).
11. Dunedin, 329 So. 2dat317.
12. Id. at 319; FLA. STAT. § 180.13(2) (1973).
13. Dunedin, 329 So. 2d at 319-20.
14. Id. at 320-21. Although the court upheld the authority of the municipality to impose an
impact fee, the court concluded that the challenged ordinance (City of Dunedin, Fla., Code § 25-7 1)
was "defective for failure to spell out necessary restrictions on the use of fees it authorizes to be
collected" and remanded the case. Id. at 321. The City of Dunedin cured the defective ordinance,
but on remand the trial court ordered the City to refund the fees collected under the defective
ordinance and paid under protest. The Second District Court of Appeals reversed this decision, and
no refunds were made. Dunedin v. Contractors & Builders Ass'n, 358 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 2d DCA
1978).
15. 431 So. 2d 606,611-12 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).
16. Id. at 607. The ordinance (Broward County, Fla., Code § 5-198(h)) gave the developer
the option of paying the fee, dedicating land in lieu of the fee, or paying a fee equal in value to such
dedicated land. Id. at 607-08.
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found that regulating development "to ensure the adequate provision of
parks" fell "squarely within" the police power delegated by the state to
each county.' 7 However, the court explained that impact fees may only
address needs "sufficiently attributable to" the new development and must
be "sufficiently earmarked for the substantial benefit" of the new
development.' 8 In other words, the local government must demonstrate a
reasonable connection, or rational nexus, between the need for additional
capital facilities and the growth in population generated by the
subdivision. In addition, the government must show a reasonable
connection, or rational nexus, between the expenditures of the funds
collected and the benefits accruing to the subdivision. 9
Florida's Supreme Court adopted the dual rational nexus test and first
authorized the use of impact fees to support public school expansion in St.
Johns County v. Northeast Florida Builders Ass'n, Inc.2" In St. Johns
County, the plaintiff claimed that an impact fee for public schools failed
the first prong of the dual rational nexus test because many new residents
did not have children and would therefore have no impact on public
schools.21 The court disagreed, reasoning that public schools "serve each
dwelling unit" and that "[during the useful life of the new dwelling units,
school-age children will come and go." Thus the court found that the

17. Id. at 614. Regarding the delegation of state power to counties, Florida is a "home rule"
state rather than a"Dillon's rule" state; under Article VIII, Section 1 of Florida's Constitution, the
state of Florida grants to charter counties and non-charter counties all powers of government not
specifically excepted by law, and section 125.01 of the Florida Statutes implements this
constitutional provision. See City of Boca Raton v. State, 595 So. 2d 25, 26-29 (Fla.1992); Home
Builders & Contractors Ass'n of Palm Beach County v. Board of County Commissioners of Palm
Beach County, 446 So. 2d 140, 142-43 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). Exercise of the government's police
power on behalf of the health, safety, and welfare of the citizenry is thereby included in the "broad
home rule powers" granted to counties. Hollywood, 431 So. 2d at 608; see also State v. City of Port
Orange, 650 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1994); Speer v. Olson, 367 So. 2d 207, 210-11 (Fla. 1978).
18. Hollywood, 431 So. 2dat 611.
19. Id. at 611-12. On the national development and use of the dual rational nexus test, as well
as alternative tests, see generally NICHOLAS, supra note 10, at 13, 31-33, 42-43, 82; Vance G.
Camisa, Impact Fees in Pennsylvania, 31 DuQ. L. REV. 455 (1993); Douglas Dennington,
CaliforniaSupreme Court Survey: Februaryl993-December1993,21 PEPP.L.REV. 1502(1994);
Jesse S. Ishikawa, Rough Proportionality;Wisconsin'sNew Impact Fee Act, 68 WIS. L. REV. 18
(1995); Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 10, at 427-33; Martin L. Leitner & Susan P. Schoettle,
A Survey of State ImpactFee EnablingLegislation, 25 URB. LAW. 491 (1993); William W. Merrill
III & Robert K. Lincoln, Linkage Fees and FairShare Regulations; Law and Method, 25 URB.
LAw. 223 (1993); David Nuffer, Utah's 1995 Impact Fee Legislation, 8 UTAH BAR J. 12 (1995);
Rhoads, supra note 10, at 481-92; Stroud & Trevarthen, supra note 10, at 719-28.
20. 583 So. 2d 635, 637-42 (Fla. 1991).
21. Id. at 638.
22. Id. Prior to enacting the St. Johns County Educational Facilities Impact Fee Ordinance,
St. Johns County had conducted acomprehensive studyon the question ofimpactfees. Anticipating
the court's emphasis on calculating fees per unit and not per occupant, this study calculated the
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county had demonstrated "a reasonable connection between the need for
additional schools and the growth in population that will accompany new
development" in satisfaction of the first prong of the dual rational nexus
test.2 3 The ordinance, however, failed the second prong of the dual rational
nexus test because the ordinance failed to ensure that the fees collected
would be spent to benefit those who paid them.24 The court ultimately
upheld the validity of the ordinance but halted collection of the impact fee
until appropriate amendments to the ordinance met the second prong of the
dual rational nexus test.y
Although the court approved the use of impact fees to fund public
school expansion in St. Johns County, 6 an alternative provision in the
county's ordinance 7 prompted the court to consider a possible
contradiction in the specific requirements of an impact fee and the
constitutional mandate of "free" public schools.2 8 The alternative provision
allowed a feepayer to submit "an independent fee calculation study"
justifying exemption from the fee.2 9 Thus, new households with no
children destined for public schools could avoid paying for public school
expansion, while new households with public school children would still
pay the fee.3" This provision made the impact fee very much like a user
fee,31 which would easily satisfy both prongs of the dual rational nexus

average cost of providing school facilities for each new single-family unit at $2,899. Estimating
that existing revenues covered $2,451 of this amount, St. Johns County set its public school impact
fee at $448 per unit. d at 637-38.
23. Id. at 638-39.
24. Id. at 639. The St. Johns County Educational Facilities Impact Fee Ordinance included
an "opt in" provision for the cities and towns of the county; the ordinance was not effective within
incorporated municipalities within the county unless that municipality entered into an interlocal
agreement with the county to collect the fees. As written, nothing in the ordinance prohibited a
municipality from "opting out" of the impact fee while still benefiting from the collection of the
fee in neighboring areas. Hence, like the defective ordinance in Dunedin, the St. Johns ordinance
included insufficient "restriction on the use of the funds to ensure that they will be spent to benefit
those who have paid the fees." Id.; see also Contractors & Builders Ass'n of Pinellas County v. City
of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314, 321 (Fla. 1976).
25. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 639-42; see also Daniel Gordon, Failing the State
ConstitutionalEducationGrade:ConstitutionalRevisionWeakening ChildrenandHuman Rights,
29 STmSoN L. REV.271,274-77 (1999); Joseph L. Parisi, St. Johns County v. Northeast Florida
Builders Association and FloridaSchool ImpactFees:An Exercise in Semantics, 16 NOVA L. REV.
569, 569-96 (1991).
26. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 642.
27. Id. at 640; St. Johns County, Fla., Ordinance 87-60 § 7(B) (Oct. 20, 1987).
28. FLA.CONST. art. IX, § 1; St. Johns County, 431 So. 2d at 640.
29. St. Johns County, Fla., Ordinance 87-60 § 7(B) (Oct. 20, 1987); St. Johns County, 431
So. 2d at 640.
30. St. Johns County, 431 So. 2d at 640.
31. As the court explained in City of Port Orange:
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test.32 A user fee, however, would contravene the constitutional
requirement of "free" public schools,33 because a student's "access to
public schools" may not depend "upon the payment of any fees. ' 34 In
response, the court severed the alternative provision before upholding the
remainder of the ordinance.35
In the instant case, the court clarified these constitutional limits on the
use of impact fees to fund public school expansion.36 The court
emphasized that, because of the required nexus between the new
development and the need for new schools, public school impact fees may
only be assessed against new dwelling units which house children or may
in the future house children. 37 Because of the constitutional mandate of
free public schools, however, public school impact fees may not be
assessed based on whether a new dwelling unit currently houses children.38
Therefore, exemptions for deed-restricted adult developments, which
cannot impact public schools, are proper, whereas exemptions for
individual households without
children would turn the impact fee into an
39
unconstitutional user fee.
The instant case also reaffirmed and delineated the requirements of the
dual rational nexus test.4° Regarding the first prong of the test, requiring
a substantial relationship between the impact of a new development and
the need for public school expansion, the court held that the development's
impact on public schools must be more than incidental or possible.4 ' For
example, a development's impact on the countywide ratio of students to

User fees are charges based upon the proprietary right of the governing body

permitting the use of the instrumentality involved. Such fees share common traits
that distinguish them from taxes; they are charged in exchange for a particular
governmental service which benefits the party paying the fee in a manner not
shared by other members of society and they are paid by choice, in that the party
paying the fee has the option of not utilizing the governmental service and thereby
avoiding the charge.
State v. City of Port Orange, 650 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1994) (citations omitted).
32. See St. Johns County, 431 So. 2d at 640.
33. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; St. Johns County, 431 So. 2d at 639-40.
34. St. Johns County, 431 So. 2d at 639.

35. Id. at 639-40. The court reasoned that without the alternative provision the impact fee
would be assessed upon each new dwelling unit regardless of whether public school children were
current occupants. L at 640; see also David L. Powell, Back to Basics on School Concurrency,26
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 451,465 (1999).
36. VolusiaCounty v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126,132-37 (Fla. 2000).

37. Id. at 137.
38. 1L at 132, 137.

39. Id. at 136-37.
40. Id. at 134-36.

41. Id. at 136.
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dwelling units, a ratio used to calculate the impact fee, is not sufficient.42
Likewise, the remote possibility that an adult disabled person will reside
in a community and exercise his right to attend public school does not
constitute sufficient impact. 3 Regarding the second prong of the test,
requiring that fees be spent to benefit those who paid them, the court held
that the benefit must be more than incidental or tangential." For example,
the possibility that adults from a development may use a public school for
night classes or for emergency shelter does not suffice to meet the benefits
prong of the dual rational nexus test. 5
By continuing to employ a strict reading of the dual rational nexus test
in evaluating the legality of impact fees, the court maintained a critical
distinction between fees and taxes.' Taxes may, in general, be levied and
spent without a specific showing of need or benefit.47 Because of the
potential for abuse, constitutions and legislatures have limited the
authority to tax; municipalities and counties are empowered to raise only
specifically defined taxes and are enjoined from raising any other tax.48
Impact fees, on the other hand, must meet the restrictions of the dual
rational nexus test, which limits the potential for abuse.4 9 With these
safeguards in place, legislatures and courts have interpreted fee collection
to be within the police powers delegated to municipalities and counties,
which facilitates the responsiveness and flexibility of local government in
land use planning.50 The court's insistence upon an undiluted application
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Il
45. Id.
46. Id. at 135.
47. See Collier County v. State, 733 So. 2d 1012, 1017 (Fla. 1999); City of Boca Raton v.
State, 595 So. 2d 25, 29 (Fla. 1992); Pamela M. Dubov, Taxation-Ad Valorem Alternatives:
Collier County v. State, 733 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 1999), 29 STETSON L. REV. 987, 987-90 (2000).
48. See Dubov,supranote47, at 987-88. Article VII of the Florida Constitution provides that
"[n]o tax shall be levied except in pursuance of law. No state ad valorem taxes shall be levied upon
real estate or tangible personal property. All other forms of taxation shall be preempted to the state
except as provided by general law." FLA. CoNs. art. VII, § 1(a). Article VII further provides that
"fc]ounties, school districts, and municipalities shall, and special districts may, be authorized by
law to levy ad valorem taxes and may be authorized by general law to levy other taxes, for their
respective purposes, except ad valorem taxes on intangible personal property and taxes prohibited
by the constitution." FLA. CoNsT. art. VII, § 9(a). The phrase "ad valorem tax" refers to a tax
assessed against real property and may be used interchangeably with the phrase "property tax."
CollierCounty, 733 So. 2d at 1014 n.2.
49. See Volusia County, 760 So. 2d at 130-34; State v. City of Port Orange, 650 So. 2d 1, 3
(Fla. 1994); St. Johns County v. N.E. Florida Builders Ass'n, 583 So. 2d 635, 637 (Fla. 1991);
Contractors & Builders Ass'n ofPinellas County v. City of Dunedin. 329 So. 2d 314,320-21 (Fla.
1976); Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606, 611-13 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983);
NICHOLAS, supra note 10, 38-42.
50. See generally FLA. STAT. §§ 125.01, 192.001 (2000); Boca Raton, 595 So. 2d at 26-29;
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of the dual rational nexus test preserves this distinction between fees and
taxes and thereby preserves a balance of public
51 policies favoring restraint
in taxation and flexibility in local planning.
Furthermore, in reconciling St. Johns County, wherein the court refused
to exempt households without children, with the instant case, wherein the
court required an exemption for dwellings which could not house children,
the court clarified that impact fees are properly based on the characteristics
of the dwelling unit rather than the unit's actual occupants.52 In St. Johns
County, the court noted that occupancy changes over the useful life of a
dwelling unit, such that impact fees must be calculated based on the
average impact that a dwelling unit of that type will have on local services.
Consideration of whether a particular set of occupants in a dwelling unit
will use more or less of a service is irrelevant, and in the context of public
schools, unconstitutional.53 In the instant case, the court again focused on
the characteristics of the dwelling units and found them to be deedrestricted such that no minors could become occupants.54 The court
concluded that a dwelling unit which could not affect the school system
should not pay an impact fee for school expansion. 5
While such careful parsing brings clarity to an emerging area of law,
the wisdom of the court's decision depends on the ongoing enforcement
of deed restrictions. For the purposes of assessing impact fees, the court
accepted a deed restriction as a characteristic of Appellee's dwelling units
on par with the units' physical characteristics, such as the number of
bedrooms. 5 6 In reality, however, owners and renters often ignore deed
restrictions when convenient, and enforcement of deed restrictions on
private property only follows an injunction arising from a civil suit
brought by a neighbor (or homeowner's association) who benefits from the
restriction. 7 Furthermore, where neighbors have habitually acquiesced to
Hollywood,431 So. 2d at 608; Speer v. Olson, 367 So. 2d 207,210-11 (Fla. 1978); Juergensmeyer
& Blake, supra note 10, at 426.
51. As the Court explained in State of Floridav. City of PortOrange, 650 So. 2d 1, 6 (Fla.
1994), "The power of a municipality to tax should not be broadened by semantics which would be
the effect of labeling what the City is here collecting a fee rather than a tax." City of PortOrange,
650 So. 2d at 3; see also Home Builders and Contractors Ass'n of Palm Beach County v. Bd. of
County Comm'rs of Palm Beach County, 446 So. 2d 140,145 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Juergensmeyer
&Blake, supra note 10, at 426.
52. Volusia County, 760 So. 2d at 136-37; St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 639-40. See
generallyNICHOLAS, supra note 10, at 85-86.

53. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 639-40.
54. Volusia County, 760 So. 2d at 134.
55. Id. at 136-37.
56. Il
57. In the context ofenforcement, such deed restrictions are treated as "equitable servitudes;"
the restrictive clause runs with the land in equity and prohibits any occupant from certain action.
ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL,, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.22 (2d ed. 1993).
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violations of deed restrictions, courts have held such restrictions to be
unenforceable.58 Local planning agencies are not empowered to enforce
deed restrictions, and at least under existing precedent, lack standing to sue
an owner of private property for the enforcement of a restriction found in
that owner's deed.59
Given these problems of enforcement, how may local planning
agencies respond when individual residents violate restrictions in their
deeds? Regarding the instant case, for example, if one child later moves
into plaintiff's development and enrolls in public school, what action may
defendant County take?" Presumably, exacting a fee from the student's
household would violate Florida's constitutional mandate for "free" public
schools.6 Alternatively, exacting a public school impact fee retroactively
upon every unit in the development would likely embroil the courts in
further litigation.62 Following the instant case, local planning agencies are
not equipped to respond to violations of deed restrictions on private
property, even though such violations may affect local planning needs.
The court's decision in the instant case also reopens the possibility that
other sorts of deed-restricted developments may seek to avoid impact
fees.63 Could a religious community, for example, claim exemption from
public school impact fees by including a deed restriction requiring that all
children attend a parochial school? 64 Alternatively, could an individual

58. See, e.g., Rowen v. Holiday Pines Prop. Owners' Ass'n, Inc., 759 So. 2d 13, 14 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2000).
59. See generally Palm Point Prop. Owners' Ass'n of Charlotte County, Inc. v, Pisarski, 626
So. 2d 195 (Fla. 1993); Cudjoe Gardens Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Payne, C. Nos. 3D00-1052,
3D00-1322, 2000 Fla. App. LEXIS 12329 (Fla. 3d DCA Sept. 27,2000).
60. In the instant case, the court discussed the enforceability of the deed restriction, but only
in the context of whether Plaintiff's "Primary Declaration" (which was not recorded) or
"Supplemental Declaration" (which was recorded) controlled the property. Volusia County,760 So.
2d at 132-34. The court in the instant case did not discuss the questions raised here.
61. In St. Johns County the court considered the testimony of Dr. James Nicholas regarding
the alternative provision of the county's ordinance. St. Johns County v. N.E. Florida Builders
Ass'n, 583 So. 2d 635, 640 (Fla. 1991). Nicholas had suggested that an occupant who avoided
paying the fee because they would send no children to public school could do so only "upon the
understanding that if a school child later occupied the home, the fee would have to be paid." Id.
However, precisely because such a scheme would violate Florida's constitutional mandate of a
"free" public school system, the court in St. Johns County severed the alternative provision. Id.
62. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. This author knows of no jurisprudence
regarding "retroactive" impact fees.
63. See Volusia County, 760 So. 2d at 136-37. The court in the instant case held that "deedrestricted housing could be exempt" from public school impact fees. ld. at 137. Read literally, this
holding invites property holders and developers to incorporate a variety of restrictions in their deeds
in an attempt to avoid impact fees.
64. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. Dr. Nicholas' testimony in St. Johns County
raised a parallel scenario, but only in the context of the alternative provision in the County's
ordinance (now severed as unconstitutional) which allowed an individual family to avoid the fee
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placing a mobile home claim exemption from public school impact fees by
incorporating a deed restriction requiring that children in the unit be homeschooled? 65 Such possibilities raise further questions regarding the
enforcement of deed restrictions and revive the constitutional question of
whether an impact fee paid primarily by households with public school
students violates Florida's constitutional mandate for a free system of
public schools. The court's decision in the instant case highlights the need
for guiding legislation regarding impact fee assessment. In states such as
Florida, explosive population growth has forced local governments to
improvise in generating revenue. A handful of judicial opinions have
interrupted this improvisation to enforce constitutional limits, but the
burden of meeting new needs by experimenting with new forms of revenue
has fallen on local governments. These local governments, especially rural
counties and smaller municipalities, are ill-equipped to craft legal
innovations in revenue generation while meeting the everyday needs of
citizens.'6 Funding the necessary expansion of the public school system is
a problem across the state, and state legislation defining the proper use of
and provide a
impact fees could ease the burden on local governments
67
developers.
for
environment
more predictable

by warranting that they would send no children to public school. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at

640. The instant case suggests that if that same family incorporated such a warranty as a deed
restriction, they would not be liable for the impact fee.
65. See supra notes 61, 64 and accompanying text. See generallyMichael W. Woodward,
FreeSchools and CheapMobile Homes; School Impact Fees Come to RuralFlorida,70 FLA. BAR.

J. 70 (1996).
66. See NICHOLAS, supra note 10, at 169-74; Juergensmeyer, supra note 10, at 434-45.

67. Such legislation in Florida would complement legislation passed in 1998 which mandated
county-wide school concurrency. FLA. STAT. ch. 98-176 (1998). See generallyGordon, supranote
25; Keri L. Howe, School Impact Fees in Colorado:Gone, but Hopefully not Forgotten,70 U.
COLO. L. REV. 257 (1998); David L. Powell, Back to Basicson School Concurrency,26 FLA. ST.
U.L. REv. 451 (1999); Craig A. Robertson, Concurrencyand its Relationto GrowthManagement,
20 NOVA L. REV. 891 (1996).
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